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It is currently unknown how lie detection accuracy is affected when someone is 
speaking in his or her second language. We examined whether language proficiency had 
an impact on lie detection. We hypothesized that when judging the veracity of second-
language speakers, participants would be better able to discriminate between truth- and 
lie-tellers and would have bias toward picking ‘lying’ since they may display cues 
associated with lying when communicating.We collected video footage of native- and 
second-language English speakers who lied or told the truth about a transgression. 
Undergraduate students (N = 51) then judged the veracity of these clips and indicated 
how confident they were in their ratings. Participants were most accurate and confident 
when judging native-language truth-tellers. In addition, participants were more likely to 
exhibit a truth-bias when observing native-language speakers, whereas they were more 
likely to exhibit a lie-bias when viewing second-language speakers. Implications for the 
justice system will be discussed.  
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Detecting Deception in Second-language Speakers  
  Generally, people are only able to detect lying as accurately as they would be able 
to predict heads or tails when tossing a coin (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). It may be 
problematic and unjust for people to rely upon their lie detection skills in forensic settings 
if they are not accurate. Researchers have extensively examined questions pertaining to 
whether detection is affected by the type or magnitude of the lie (e.g., O’Sullivan, Frank, 
Hurley, & Tiwana, 2009). However, very little research has explored the implications of 
communication barriers for interrogations. Specifically, it is unknown how lie detection 
accuracy is affected when someone is speaking in his or her second language. 
Approaches to Lie Detection  
 There are two phases in lie detection research: (1) the production of the lie- and 
truth-telling stimuli; (2) others’ observation and judgment of the stimuli. First, lie 
detection researchers must create scenarios that mimic how lie-telling is elicited in daily 
life or during interrogations. Individuals will be videotaped while lying or telling the truth 
about an opinion (e.g., capital punishment; Cheng & Broadhurst, 2005), event (e.g., going 
to a restaurant; Vrij, et al., 2009), or transgression (e.g., committing a crime; Vrij & 
Mann, 2001a). Typically, lie detection experiments have been conducted in laboratory 
settings (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, et al., 2009). Researchers either examine lie-
telling that has been purely experimentally manipulated (i.e., the participant is told to lie 
or tell the truth) or lying that is naturalistic (i.e., the participant is placed in a situation in 






 Once videos are compiled of individuals either lying or telling the truth, researchers 
move on to the lie detection phase of the research. During this phase, observers watch the 
video clips and determine whether each participant in the video is lying or telling the 
truth. Typically, these observers are university students or police officers (e.g., DePaulo 
& Pfeifer, 1986; Kohnken, 1987). Many contemporary lie detection studies have asked 
observers to rate their level of confidence in their veracity judgments on a scale from zero 
to one hundred (e.g., Kassin et al., 2007). 
Lie Detection Accuracy  
 Across the majority of studies, individuals’ ability to accurately identify deception 
is at, or near, chance levels (i.e., 50%). Specifically, a meta-analysis indicated that the 
average lie detection accuracy rate for laypersons was 54%: 61% of truth judgments were 
correctly identified and 47% of lie judgments were correctly identified (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006). The inability to detect deception above chance levels is not only found in 
laypersons, but also law enforcement officials (e.g., police officers, federal polygraphers, 
judges, robbery investigators; e.g., Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). 
 A few researchers argue that certain groups are able to detect deception. Ekman and 
O’Sullivan (1991) found that Secret Service agents’ accuracy was significantly higher 
than 50%. Ekman, O’Sullivan, and Frank (1999) also identified several groups that were 
able to detect deception at a level greater than chance: sheriffs, federal officials, and 
clinical psychologists. However, generally, law enforcement groups can only detect 





 One of the reasons why law enforcement officials performed poorly may be 
because the deception paradigms that they were judging did not align with the contexts in 
which they had professional experience (O’Sullivan et al., 2009). Specifically, the stakes 
associated with lying may have affected their accuracy. O’Sullivan et al. (2009) have 
argued that low-stakes lies are those that are unimportant, in terms of the consequences 
associated with being caught. Conversely, high-stakes lies have some personal 
significance to the individual because of either the subject matter and/or the 
consequences if they are (un)successful. Low-stakes lying – which is commonly 
produced in lie detection studies – may be difficult to detect simply because the lie-tellers 
may not mimic the behaviors exhibited by real-life lie-telling (e.g., anxiety).  
 Researchers have attempted to create high-stakes scenarios that are applicable to 
forensic contexts. Vrij and Mann (2001a) had police officers watch fragments of an 
interrogation of a suspect and identify whether the suspect was lying or telling the truth. 
Although the study was based only on the detection of one individual’s statements, police 
officers were significantly better able to identify truth-telling (approximately 70% 
accuracy) than lie-telling (approximately 57% accuracy). However, police officers’ 
overall accuracy was still at approximately chance levels. Police officers’ may have only 
performed around chance levels within this study because they were only judging one 
individual, and he may have displayed idiosyncrasies related to truth- and lie-telling. 
Also, given that lie- and truth-telling segments were taken from the same interview, the 
suspect’s lie-telling may have influenced how he told the truth (and vice versa). In 
another study, police officers were recruited to detect deception in news conferences in 





kidnapped their family members (Vrij & Mann, 2001b). In all of the clips, the family 
member was actually the murderer (i.e., he or she was lying). Again, police officers 
detected deception at the level of chance. Yet, police officers’ may have again performed 
around chance levels because they were viewing videos that were not in their native 
languages. Overall, the use of high-stakes lies did not impact lie detection accuracy; 
however, as previously mentioned, there were several methodological limitations 
identified in these studies.  
 When the problems encountered in earlier studies were corrected, police officers’ 
judgments of deception were more accurate. Mann, Vrij, and Bull (2004) found that 
police officers’ accuracy was greater than chance when they judged a real-life 
interrogation. Police officers watched several video clips of real suspects who were either 
lying or telling the truth about having committed a crime. There was a high correlation 
between self-reported interrogation experience and accuracy. A more recent review by 
O’Sullivan et al., (2009) revealed that high-stakes lies increased accuracy rates, 
particularly those of law enforcement officials. Thus, observers can achieve higher-than-
chance levels of accuracy in lie detection studies when real-life, high-stakes scenarios are 
used.  
Lie Detection Confidence  
 Overall, observers overestimate their confidence in their lie detection judgments. 
For example, researchers have examined law enforcement officials and found that they 
are not only more confident in their deception judgments than laypersons, but also 





officers estimate that their lie detection accuracy is 77% (Kassin, et al., 2007). The 
overconfidence of law enforcement officials in their judgments may be due to training 
that they have received or the knowledge that they have obtained through experience 
(e.g., Meissner & Kassin, 2002). It is difficult to determine how this overconfidence 
affects their assumptions about suspects’ guilt or innocence (Kassin & Fong, 1999). This 
overconfidence likely occurs because police officers and laypersons think that their 
decisions are generally correct; however there is no direct link between accuracy and 
confidence (DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997).  
 To compound the undesirable combination of low accuracy and high confidence in 
deception detection, a few studies have suggested that a response bias may underlie 
decision-making. Typically, laypersons are thought to exhibit a truth-bias (i.e., a tendency 
to believe that people are telling the truth; e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Meissner and 
Kassin (2002) found that prior experience in law enforcement affected the type of bias 
present. Compared to university students, police officers were more likely to label 
individuals as lie-tellers. 
  The Role of Cognitive Load in Lie Detection  
Recently, researchers have begun to examine the role of cognitive load in 
deception (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008a). Creating a lie requires memory (e.g., 
remembering the lie and its chronological development) and other cognitive resources 
related to executive function (e.g., planning the lie, inhibiting behavioral responses 
indicative of deception, monitoring performance). Thus, when individuals lie, cognitive 





resources (e.g., slower speech, increased speech errors and hesitations), particularly when 
cognitive demands are high (De Paulo, et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & 
Bull, 2008b). Lie-tellers also look like they are thinking harder that truth-tellers (Vrij et 
al., 2008a). Thus, the multiple factors taxing cognition may make the visual and auditory 
differences between lie-tellers and truth-tellers more distinguishable (Vrij et al., 2008a, 
2008b). If more demand is placed upon individuals’ cognitive resources (e.g., working 
memory) when they are attempting to lie, then they will be less able to monitor and 
inhibit their own behaviors, and their lie-telling may be easier to detect (McCornack, 
1997; Vrij et al., 2008a; Warren, Schertler, & Bull, 2009). 
Second-language Speakers and Lie Detection 
Speaking in a second language may also increase cognitive load. Research has 
shown that speaking in a second language places demands on neural processing because 
it requires the use of additional motor neurons that are involved in both the temporal and 
sequential organization of words (Perani & Abutalebi, 2005). These increases in neural 
activity are directly linked to declarative memory processes in second-language speakers; 
thus, it is more difficult for them to engage in word and event recall (Ullman, 2001).  
Thus, speaking in a second language in conjunction with lie-telling will likely 
create large increases in cognitive load. Broadbent (1957) suggested that cognitive load 
increases when attention must be divided during the simultaneous performance of two 
tasks. When one task requires a lot of working memory and input to create a solution, it 
creates a lag in attention- switching; in turn, the second task does not receive as much 





would significantly increase cognitive load, and performance of one of the tasks should 
suffer. In particular, second-language speakers may compromise their abilities to control 
the leakage of deception, and their lies may be easier to detect than native-language 
speakers’ lies.  
 Many of the cues that are thought to be predictors of deception may also be present 
when individuals attempt to communicate in a second language. Overall, individuals have 
many incorrect beliefs about the cues to deception (Akehurst, Kohnken, Vrij, & Bull, 
1996). For example, lie-tellers are commonly thought to avert eye gaze, fidget, groom or 
self-manipulate (e.g., adjust clothing), and cover their mouths (Akehurst, et al., 1996; 
DePaulo, et al., 1985; Vrij, 1991). However, second-language speakers are more likely to 
avert eye gaze, self-manipulate, and appear nervous -- especially when they are feeling 
anxious (Gregerson, 2005). Thus, second-language speakers might naturally display 
nonverbal cues that are associated with deception when communicating truthfully. It is 
possible that these linguistic cues create additional confusion during deception detection.  
Recent research has found that individuals may be sensitive to a few of the 
difficulties associated with speaking in a second language. Da Silva, Leach, Vrantsidis, 
Meissner, and Kassin (2010) examined people’s perceptions of native- versus second-
language lie-tellers. They found that both undergraduate students and police officers 
reported using the same cues to detect deception, regardless of speakers’ language 
proficiencies. However, there were a few significant differences in terms of their 
perceptions of native- and second-language speakers. Both groups thought that, compared 





differences between telling the truth and lying or to understand the questions being asked. 
It is unclear whether these beliefs affect lie detection performance.  
To my knowledge, only one study has focused on the impact of second-language 
speaking on lie detection. Cheng and Broadhurst (2005) randomly assigned individuals to 
lie or tell the truth in either their first language (Cantonese) or second language (English). 
Post-graduate students watched video clips of these individuals and judged each person’s 
veracity. The researchers presented descriptive data that suggested that native- and 
second-language speakers showed different patterns of verbal and nonverbal behaviors. 
For example, second-language deceivers tried to maintain eye contact, decrease speech 
hesitations, and control changes in pitch more so than native-language deceivers. 
However, observers were no more accurate in their identifications of second-language 
(vs. native-language) deception.  
Despite the advances made by Cheng and Broadhurst (2005), there are several 
concerns about the internal and external validity of their study. First, they experimentally 
manipulated deception: individuals were instructed to lie or tell the truth about their 
opinions. Participants may not have been behaving as they would in a forensic setting. 
Naturalistic lie-telling (in which the individual freely chooses to lie or tell the truth) 
would be more applicable to a forensic setting. Second, the authors noted that they 
invoked high-stakes deception because participants lied or told the truth about a 
controversial topic (i.e., capital punishment). However, it was impossible to establish 
ground truth. That is, researchers could not be entirely certain of the actual veracity – or 
magnitude of the consequences of being caught lying – of individuals’ statements. Third, 





Participants were excluded from the study only if they reported English proficiency levels 
below 3 on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Very Poor English; 7 = Very Good English). The 
accuracy of these self-reports (i.e., the actual fluency of each participant) is unknown; 
participants may have misreported their proficiency levels. Without the use of validated 
tests of actual fluency, language proficiency effects are difficult to gauge. Most 
importantly, throughout the study, the researchers allowed participants to code-switch. 
That is, participants were able to alternate between speaking Cantonese and English. 
Allowing code-switching may have affected the findings, as the participants were not 
speaking exclusively in their stronger, native-language (Cantonese) or in their weaker, 
second-language (English). Code-switching may have been a way for second-language 
speakers to decrease cognitive load. In turn, there may not have been significant 
differences between native- and second-language speakers because cognitive demands 
were the same in both groups.   
The Present Experiment 
In this experiment, I examined undergraduate students’ ability to detect lie-telling 
and truth-telling in native- and second-language speakers. Unlike in Cheng and 
Broadhurst’s (2005) study, code-switching was not permitted. This approach maximized 
cognitive load and ensured clear differences between the language groups. Ground truth 
was established in this experiment by recording the participants’ actions using a hidden 
video camera.  
This experiment involved naturalistic, high-stakes lie-telling. Participants were 
placed in a scenario in which they could commit a transgression (i.e., cheat on a test). 





during this test; whether they decided to share their answers was their decision. Then, 
they were questioned about this transgression in English, which was either their first or 
second language. Participants were not instructed to lie or tell the truth; rather, their 
responses were volitional. Video footage of their answers was then shown to 
undergraduate students, who were asked to detect deception and rate their confidence in 
each judgment.  
Hypotheses 
 Discrimination. Observers were expected to have less difficulty discriminating 
between lie- and truth-tellers speaking in their second languages as compared to their 
native languages. Detection of second-language speakers’ veracity was hypothesized to 
be easier because of the increased cognitive load associated with lie-telling and speaking 
in a second language.   
 Bias. We hypothesized that observers would be more likely to label second-
language speakers than native-language speakers as lie-tellers. This expectation was 
based on second-language speakers’ tendency to display more cues associated with lie-
telling anytime they are speaking.   
 Confidence. Observers were expected to be significantly less confident about their 
judgments when viewing second-language speakers than when viewing native-language 
speakers. Although it might indeed be easier to discriminate between truth- and lie-
tellers, it could be challenging to interpret second-language speakers’ behaviors; thus, 






Chapter 2: Phase 1 - Cheating Paradigm  
Method 
 Research Design. The design for this phase was a 2 (Statement type: lie vs. 
truth) x 2 (Language: native language vs. second language) between-participants 
factorial. Participants were randomly assigned to condition. Truth-tellers were not 
induced to cheat on a test and, when asked about their actions, they told the truth (i.e., 
they said that they did not cheat). Lie-tellers were induced to cheat (i.e., a confederate 
asked for help during the test), cheated, and lied about it. Participants who were induced 
to cheat and told the truth in response to one or more of the questions were considered 
confessors. These participants were excluded because they were not pure truth-tellers or 
pure lie-tellers.      
Participants. Twenty-nine students were recruited from an on-campus English as 
a Second Language learning center (i.e., Culture Works). When individuals entered the 
Culture Works program, their English language proficiency was assessed in terms of their 
reading, writing, speaking, and comprehension abilities. Following assessment, they were 
assigned to a classification level that matched their proficiency within Culture Works’ 
guidelines. There were four levels of proficiency in Culture Works that aligned with the 
Canada Language Benchmarks (CLB): Level 1 = CLB 5/6 (beginner), Level 2 = CLB 7/8 
(low), Level 3 = CLB 9/10 (moderate), Level 4 = CLB 11/12+ (high). I recruited 
participants from Level 1 (i.e., the lowest level of English language proficiency) and 
Level 2 (i.e., the second-lowest level of English language proficiency) as these students 
were classified as “beginners” in terms of their speaking abilities. These students were 





and 10 students confessed to having cheated. Given that I only wished to utilize pure 
truth- and lie-tellers, I used only video footage of 10 truth-tellers and 5 lie-tellers. 
In addition, 35 undergraduate students, whose native language was English, were 
recruited from Introductory Psychology classes at UOIT. These Psychology students 
participated in exchange for course credit. In total, there were 15 truth-tellers, 12 lie-
tellers, and 8 confessors in this group. To ensure that the two language groups were 
equal, only 10 truth-tellers and 5 lie-tellers were used.  
Materials. 
Demographic questionnaire. An 11- item questionnaire was used to obtain 
participants’ demographic information (see Appendix A). Participants were asked to 
provide information related to gender, age, and race. In addition, participants were asked 
five questions about their language proficiencies (e.g., “What language(s) do you 
consider your native (or first) language(s)?”). Finally, participants were asked three 
questions about their experiences during the study. These questions assessed 
comprehension, difficulty, and nervousness during the test on a 10-point scale from 0 
(not at all) to 10 (extremely).  
Puzzler tests. Participants were asked to complete four problem-solving tasks (see 
Appendix B). In the first task the participant was asked to calculate the height of an 
object based on given measurements. The second task involved having the participant 
describe the steps required to change one word into another word by only altering one 





triangles were within a figure. The fourth task consisted of a series of anagrams that the 
participant was asked to solve. 
 Interview questions. Participants were asked a series of open-ended and closed-
ended questions about whether they had committed the transgression. Specifically, each 
student was asked, “What do you think the problem is?”; “I left the room. I was gone for 
fifteen minutes. Can you describe everything that happened from the minute that I left 
until I returned?”; “Can you be more specific? I really need to know what happened.”;  
“Did you ask the other student (her) for help?”; “Did she ask you for help?”; “Did you 
share answers?”; “While I was gone, did you cheat on the test?”; “What do you think I 
should do about this?” 
Procedure. Participants were recruited to participate in a problem-solving study 
called Puzzler. All sessions were conducted in a small psychology laboratory on campus. 
Individually, the participant waited outside the laboratory doors with another ‘participant’ 
(i.e., a confederate posing as another student) until being greeted by a female 
experimenter. Upon entering the laboratory, the participant was informed that they would 
be completing a series of logic problems. The experimenter also informed them that 
Facilities and Building Management was testing the lighting throughout the laboratory, 
and that the current lighting may make them feel calm and relaxed. The participant was 
provided with Puzzler tests and specifically told not to share or discuss individual 
problems. Then, the participant was left alone in the room – with the confederate – for 
fifteen minutes to complete the questions. In the lie condition, the confederate asked the 
participant for help with one of the questions; in the truth condition, the confederate did 





blind to condition (i.e., she did not know whether or not the participant chose to cheat on 
the test). 
 After the Puzzler tests were completed, the experimenter re-entered the room and 
collected the tests. Before leaving the room, she gave the participants the Demographic 
questionnaire. When the experimenter returned to collect the questionnaire she looked 
worried and said, “I have to check on something. I’ll be back in a moment.”  Again, the 
experimenter left the participants alone in the test room. During this period, the 
confederate commented that the experimenter looked upset and asked the participant 
what he or she thought was wrong. In the lie condition, the confederate also mentioned to 
the participant that he or she should not tell the experimenter about being asked for help 
or sharing answers.  
After approximately one minute, the experimenter returned to the room. The 
experimenter said that there may be a problem with the tests because both participants 
(i.e., participant and confederate) had the same wrong answer. The confederate was asked 
to wait outside the room in the reception area until it was her turn to be interviewed. 
Then, once they were alone in the room, the experimenter told the participant that she 
believed that they had shared their answers throughout the experiment. She explained that 
she had contacted her professor and that this may be considered a case of cheating. The 
experimenter then asked the participant the Interview questions. The interview was 
conducted in English; code-switching was not allowed because the experimenter did not 





All participants were fully debriefed at the conclusion of the study. The entire 
procedure was videotaped using a hidden camera. The duration of the experiment was 
approximately one hour. All procedures were approved by the University of Ontario 







Chapter 3: Phase 2 Deception Detection  
Method 
 Research Design. In this phase, I used a 2 (Statement type: lie vs. truth) x 2 
(Language: native language vs. second language) within-participants design. 
Undergraduate students all watched the same videos of native- and second-language 
truth- and lie-tellers.  
 Participants. Fifty-one undergraduate students (20 males and 31 females) were 
recruited from the Introductory Psychology participant pool to take part in the study. The 
average age of students was 20.37 years (SD = 2.79). Participants from nine different 
ethnic groups were included: Arab/West Asian (n = 4), Black (n = 5), White (n = 15), 
Hispanic (n = 1), Latin American (n = 1), South Asian (n = 19), South East Asian (n = 2), 
Other (n = 4). Students participated in the study in exchange for extra credit. 
 Materials. 
 Demographic questionnaire 2. In addition to the items listed in the demographic 
questionnaire (see the Cheating Paradigm), participants were asked five additional 
questions to assess occupation, training, and experience with lie detection (see Appendix 
C). 
 Video clips. Video footage was obtained from the modified Russano, Meissner, 
Narchet, & Kassin (2005) cheating paradigm in Phase 1. Participants’ upper bodies and 
faces were visible throughout the session. In total, I compiled clips of 20 truth-tellers and 
10 lie-tellers being interrogated (M length per clip = 92.73 seconds, SD = 32.17). Fifteen 





Introductory Psychology course. The other 15 clips were of second-language speakers 
who had been recruited from the on-campus English as a Second Language learning 
center (i.e., Culture Works). The clips contained 27 males and 3 females. The average 
age of students was 20.31 years (SD = 1.85). Participants from nine different ethnic 
groups were included: Arab/West Asian (n = 12), Black (n = 1), Chinese (n = 4), South 
Asian (n = 2), South East Asian (n = 2), White (n = 8), Latin American (n = 1). Where 
possible, we yoked native language participants to second language participants in terms 
of race and gender – we tried to match both the race and gender within video clips that 
we chose to use from both the native and second language clips available.  
 Lie detection decisions. Participants were asked to indicate whether the individual 
in the video clip was lying or telling the truth about sharing his or her answers on the test. 
 Confidence. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were in each lie 
detection decision on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 100% (extremely confident).  
Procedure. Individually, the participant was tested in a small, quiet room. The 
entire study was conducted on a computer using MediaLab (Jarvis, 2006). First, the 
participant was given instructions. Then, the participant viewed thirty randomized video 
clips of people lying or telling the truth about a transgression (i.e. cheating on the Puzzler 
test). Following each clip, the participant was asked to indicate whether the individual in 
the video clip was lying or telling the truth and their confidence in their judgment. The 
participant was then asked to complete the Demographic questionnaires. The participant 
was fully debriefed at the conclusion of the study. The duration of the experiment was 





Chapter 4: Results 
Lie Detection Accuracy 
Preliminary analyses involving participant gender yielded inconsistent results. 
Although there were some significant differences in terms of gender, they were not 
consistent across analyses and therefore were difficult to interpret. Thus, all further 
analyses were collapsed across gender.   
I used a Language (native language vs. second language) x Veracity (lie vs. truth) 
within-participants ANOVA to test overall accuracy. Contrary to my hypothesis, 
participants were significantly more accurate when viewing native-language speakers (M 
= 0.57, SD = 0.19), 95% CI [0.54, 0.60] than when viewing second-language speakers (M 
= 0.49, SD = 0.23), 95% CI [0.45, 0.53], F(1, 50) = 17.37, p < .001, d = 0.38. In addition, 
participants were significantly more accurate when viewing truth-tellers (M = 0.65, SD = 
0.19), 95% CI [0.61, 0.70] than lie-tellers (M = 0.40, SD = 0.24), 95% CI [0.34, 0.46], 
F(1, 50) = 37.04, p < .001, d = 1.16. However, these main effects were qualified by a 
higher-order interaction between Language and Veracity, F(1, 50) = 17.37, p < .001, ηp2 
= 0.26 (Figure 1). Post hoc analyses, using paired-samples t-tests, revealed that 
participants were significantly more accurate when viewing native-language truth-tellers 
(M = 0.75, SD = 0.17), 95% CI [0.70, 0.80] than second-language truth-tellers (M = 0.56, 
SD = 0.20), 95% CI [0.50, 0.62], t(50) = 6.56, p < .001, d = 1.86. However, participants 
were equally accurate when viewing native-language lie-tellers (M = 0.38, SD = 0.22), 
95% CI [0.32, 0.45] and second-language lie-tellers (M = 0.42, SD = 0.26) 95% CI [0.34, 





Using a one-sample t-test, I compared participants’ overall accuracy to chance 
(i.e., 50%). When participants viewed native-language truth-tellers, their judgments were 
significantly more accurate than chance, t(50) = 10.53, p < .001, d = 2.98. Similarly, 
when participants viewed second-language truth-tellers, their judgments were 
significantly more accurate than chance, t(50) = 2.09, p = .042, d = 0.59. Conversely, 
when participants viewed native-language lie-tellers and second-language lie-tellers, their 
judgments were significantly less accurate than chance, t(50) = -3.85, p < .001, d = -1.09 
and t(50) = -2.33, p = .024, d = -0.66, respectively.  
Signal Detection Analyses 
I used Signal Detection Theory (Green and Swets, 1966), to determine how well 
observers discriminated between lie-tellers and truth-tellers (i.e., d′). This approach was 
also used to determine whether observers were more likely to choose one response 
option, such as indicating that most individuals were lying (i.e., bias).  
Discrimination. I conducted a paired-samples t-test, with Language as the 
independent variable, on d'. Contrary to my hypothesis, participants were better able to 
discriminate between truth- and lie-telling native-language speakers (M = 0.31, SD = 
0.41), 95% CI [0.19, 0.42] than second-language speakers (M = -0.03, SD = 0.53), 95% 
CI [-0.18, 0.12], t(50) = 4.45, p < .001, d = 1.26 Using a one-sample t-test, I then 
examined participants’ ability to discriminate between truth- and lie-tellers by comparing 
their d′ values to zero (indicative of no sensitivity). Participants could discriminate 
between truth- and lie-telling native-language speakers, t(50) = 5.38, p < .001, d = 1.52, 





Response bias. I conducted a paired-samples t-test, with Language as the 
independent variable, on β. There were significant differences in terms of participants’ 
biases toward native-language speakers (M = 0.86, SD = 0.29), 95% CI [-0.22, -0.06] and 
second-language speakers (M = 1.12, SD = 0.37), 95% CI [-0.02, -0.23], t(50) = -4.31, p 
< .001, d = -1.22. Using a one-sample t-test, I examined participants’ bias by comparing 
β values to a score of one (indicative of no bias). Consistent with my hypothesis, 
participants were more likely to call native-language speakers truth-tellers than lie-tellers 
(i.e., exhibit a truth-bias), t(50) = -3.44, p = .001, 95% CI [-0.22, -0.06] d = -0.97 . 
However, they were significantly more likely to call second-language speakers lie-tellers 
(i.e., display a lie-bias), t(50) = 2.37, p = .022, 95% CI [0.02, 0.23], d = 0.67.  
Lie Detection Confidence  
I used a Language x Veracity within-participants ANOVA to test participants’ 
confidence in their decisions. Consistent with my hypothesis, participants were 
significantly more confident when viewing native-language speakers (M = 78.73, SD = 
13.41), 95% CI [75.10, 82.35] than second-language speakers (M = 74.95, SD = 16.97), 
95% CI [70.35, 79.55], F(1, 50) = 13.49, p = .001, d = 0.25. There was no significant 
main effect of veracity, F(1, 50) = 2.23, p = .141, d = 0.04. There was, however, an 
interaction between Language and Veracity, F(1, 50) = 10.82, p = .020, ηp2 = 0.18 
(Figure 2). Post hoc analyses, using paired samples t-tests, revealed that participants were 
significantly more confident when viewing native-language truth-tellers (M = 80.68, SD 
= 12.26), 95% CI [77.23, 84.13] than second-language truth-tellers (M = 74.28, SD = 
16.49), 95% CI [69.64, 78.92], t(50) = 5.48, p < .001, d = 1.55. However, participants 





14.56), 95% CI [72.68, 80.87] and second-language lie-tellers (M = 75.62, SD = 17.43), 
95% CI [70.72, 80.52], t(50) = 0.81, p = .420, d = 0.23.  
Relationships between Accuracy and Confidence  
 There was a significant correlation between accuracy and confidence when 
participants viewed native-language truth-tellers, r(50) = 0.40, p = .004. However, there 
were no significant correlations between accuracy and confidence when participants 
viewed native-language lie-tellers, r(50) = -0.18, p = .208, second-language truth-tellers, 



















Chapter 5: Discussion 
I examined whether language proficiency had an impact on lie detection accuracy, 
confidence, and bias. Results were consistent with the lie detection literature in terms of 
observers’ accuracy and confidence levels when judging native-language speakers (e.g., 
Bond & DePaulo, 2006). However, there were several differences between how observers 
classified native- versus second-language truth- and lie-tellers.  
I hypothesized that participants would be better able to discriminate between 
truth- and lie-telling second-language speakers (than native-language speakers) because 
of increases in cognitive load. However, I did not find support for this hypothesis. 
Participants were actually better at discriminating between truth- and lie-telling native-
language speakers. They were unable to discriminate between truth- and lie-tellers who 
spoke in their second languages. Researchers have found that when individuals speak in 
their second languages, they often display far less emotion than native language speakers 
(Bond & Lai, 1986). In fact, many individuals actually choose to speak in their second 
languages to distance themselves, especially when they are faced with anxiety-provoking 
or embarrassing situations (Altarriba & Rivera–Santiago, 1994; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 
2002). Thus, possibly due to the decreased emotionality of second-language speakers, 
observers could have had a more difficult time discriminating between truth- and lie-
tellers. However, further research is required to determine whether there are overt 
behavioral differences in the emotional displays of native and second-language speakers.  
I also examined whether there was a response bias present when participants 
viewed native- and second-language speakers. Consistent with my hypothesis, and 





likely to label native-language speakers as truth-tellers than lie-tellers. As expected, these 
participants also exhibited a lie-bias toward second-language speakers. Second-language 
speakers tend to display more nonverbal and verbal cues that have been linked to 
deception simply when communicating (Bialystok, Craik, Green, & Gollan, 2009; 
Gregersen, 2005; Vrij, 2000). For example, second-language speakers provide less 
detailed accounts of events because they must actively inhibit the neural control 
mechanisms that would otherwise automatically have them respond in their first 
languages (Wang, Xue, Chen, Xue, & Dong, 2007). In addition, second-language 
speakers must rely heavily on temporal lobe structures that can hinder their retrievable 
vocabulary; if the lexicon system is not well developed, speakers have much more 
difficulty with expressions of memory for events (Ullman, 2001). Given the extra effort 
that must be exerted by second-language speakers and the resulting changes in cues that 
are normally associated with deception, it is not surprising that observers were more 
likely to label them (as compared to native language speakers) as lie-tellers 
There may also be individual biases within observers. Smith and Bond (1994) 
have noted that, when individuals provide statements that are challenging to comprehend, 
observers attempt to determine the source of their difficulties. Bond and Atoum (2000) 
suggested that some observers externalize blame when they cannot understand foreign 
accents. Individuals who speak with accents are also viewed as ‘different’ and – most 
importantly - untrustworthy (Brennan & Brennan, 1981; Munro, 2003).Thus, it is 
possible that observers had more negative overall impressions of second-language 





Although observers tended to have a lot of confidence in their judgments, I 
predicted that they would be more confident when viewing native- compared to second-
language speakers. I did not find support for this hypothesis. Because individuals were 
not as familiar with second-language speakers, it may have been more difficult for 
observers to interpret their behaviors. In turn, observers were less confident when making 
their judgments.  
Limitations 
There were several limitations associated with the design of our study. The first 
issue has to do with our decision to use a within-participants design. This design may 
have elicited demand characteristics. Observers may have realized that the study was 
about language proficiency and, thus, they may have based their decisions on their 
expectations about what we were looking to examine, rather than on the actual 
behaviours of the individuals being interrogated. It is possible that participants were 
simply labeling truth- and lie-tellers based on whether the individual in the video spoke 
English proficiently or not; this could have accounted for why we found individuals more 
likely to label native-language speakers as truth-tellers and second-language speakers as 
lie-tellers. To address this confound, there must be examination of whether these findings 
are still present when a between-participants design is conducted (i.e., when individuals 
only watch all native- or all second-language video clips).  
This study was also not an entirely crossed experimental design. We ensured that 
the native- and second-languages of participants was English. Further research should 
examine whether the results generalize to individuals who are interviewed in a (second) 





the second-language speakers. In the future we would control for native- and second-
languages of participants by testing in a population that will have varying fluencies of 
only two languages. For example, we may test in a location that is bilingual – English and 
French only. Controlling for language would be the first step toward a crossed 
experimental design; however, we might also look for a location that would serve to 
control for race. Although lie detection research has not located differences in terms of 
race or culture, we may examine this in the future as a connection to language.  
In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that some participants began to use 
different strategies when viewing multiple native- and second-language speakers – 
representing a ‘learning curve’ of sorts. However, observers were not provided with 
immediate feedback. It is difficult to determine if participants’ thoughts about their 
strategies influenced their confidence ratings. This issue should be examined in future 












Chapter 6: Future Directions 
 It is difficult to determine the ecological validity associated with a cheating 
paradigm. I was able to establish ground truth within a deception scenario that was 
relevant to university students. Accusations of cheating and the threat of repercussions 
associated with academic dishonesty likely created high stakes lying. However, being 
asked about cheating on a test might not be comparable to being interrogated about a 
murder. Thus, the generalizability of these findings to forensic contexts can only be 
suggested. Further research should examine videotaped, real-life interrogations of native- 
and second-language speakers.  
Follow-up studies should also address the generalizability of my results to 
different populations. Specifically, researchers may wish to examine whether the findings 
extend to law enforcement officials who have had training or experience in second-
language lie detection. Customs officers, particularly those who are at airports, are 
constantly interacting with passengers who are speaking in their second languages. They 
must make quick decisions about veracity that could have an impact on the safety of 
others. Due to their experience, customs officers may, indeed, have detection abilities that 
surpass those of laypersons. In addition, the deception detection performance of law 
enforcement officials would have policy implications. For example, if it is determined 
that customs officers are better able to detect deception in less proficient speakers, then 
these findings would support their current practice of interrogating individuals in their 
second languages. Alternatively, if officers are less able to detect deception in second-
language speakers, then there may be evidence to suggest that individuals should not be 





In addition, it would be interesting to examine whether there are differences in 
observer judgments across the spectrum of language proficiency. In my study, I examined 
individuals with low levels of English proficiency in terms of Canada Language 
Benchmarks. Yet, second-language participants exhibited high enough English 
proficiency to be placed into a pre-university ESL program. It would be important to 
examine the boundary conditions of my discrimination, bias, and confidence findings. 
That is, I am interested in examining what occurs when observers watch video clips of 
individuals who exhibit lower or higher English proficiencies. Specifically, it is important 
to determine whether there is a decrease in accuracy and confidence as proficiency 
decreases and vice versa. It would also be important to determine whether there was a 
negative relationship between bias and proficiency. If so, I might have reason to suggest 
new procedures for interrogation based on the proficiencies of the individuals being 
interrogated. 
Conclusions  
My study is among the first to examine lie-telling in second-language speakers. I 
found that participants were better able to discriminate between truth- and lie-tellers 
when they were viewing native-language speakers than second-language speakers. 
Participants were also more likely to label native-language speakers as truth-tellers and 
second-language speakers as lie-tellers. Given the potential implications for law 
enforcement personnel and for second-language speakers, the difficulties and biases 
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Figure 1. Participants’ overall accuracy when viewing native- and second-language speakers. 






































Figure 2. Participants’ overall confidence judgments for native- and second-language speakers. 






































Appendix A: Demographic Questionnaire 
Please provide the following information: 
 
1.  Gender:   Male         Female 
 
2.  Age:  ___ years 
 
3. Race (check the one that most describes you):  
______ Aboriginal (Inuit, Métis, North American Indian)  
______ Arab/West Asian (e.g., Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Moroccan) 






 ______ Latin American 
______ South Asian  
______ South East Asian 
______ White (Caucasian) 
______ Other ________________________ 
 
4. What language(s) do you consider your native (or first) language (s)? _________________________ 
 
5. What language(s) do you speak at home? ________________________________________ 
 








7. What is your English proficiency?  
a) Level 1 
b) Level 2  
c) Level 3 
d) Level 4 
e) English is my first language 
 
8. How many years have you been speaking English? __________________ 
 
9. Did you understand the study instructions? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all        Extremely well  
      
10. How hard were the Puzzler problems?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all        Extremely hard 
 
11. How nervous were you when you were answering the Puzzler problems? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 















Appendix B: Puzzler Tests 
 
 











































Problem # 2 
 
Starting with the word “COOL”, change one letter at a time until you have the word “HEAT”. 
Each change must result in a proper word, and you can use any letters in the alphabet.  Keeping 
in mind that you can only change one letter per step, what is the minimum number of steps 
required to achieve this change?  What are the steps? 
Example: KID to DAD  (KID, DID, DAD) 
























Problem # 3 
 
 
How many triangles can you find in the figure above?  Look carefully – there are more than 16! 
 
 






















Each word jumble can be unscrambled to form a common word. There is a correct answer for 
each jumble. 
 
Example: LSOOCH unscrambled is SCHOOL 
 
1. AGMNO:  ____________________ 
 
2. UFLAT:  ____________________ 
 
3. OLBDUE: ____________________ 
 
4. NITGA:  ____________________ 
 












Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire 2 
 
12. What is your occupation? ___________________ 
 
13.  Have you ever worked in law enforcement?   Yes      No 
 Number of years:  ____ 
 
14.  Have you ever taken courses related to lie detection?   Yes      No 
  Which ones? ________________________________ 
 
15.  Please rate your experience with lie detection: 
 
  Not at all             A little                                  Somewhat              Very 
experienced    experienced       Average        experienced       experienced 
        1                          2                        3                      4                            5 
  
16.  Please briefly describe the experiences you have had with lie detection: 
 
 
 
 
 
